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The agency contract has been identified as a major source of problematic 
relatiorzship between bankers and the srpiall business owners. The problems which 
arise from this relationship, such as asymmetry of information, moral hazard and' 
adverse selection, cause drfficulties for banks to channel the required funds to the 
small business sector. To overcome these problems, banks require greater level of 
compensation and protection, such as charging high interest rates, ashng for higher 
collateral requirements, and or imposing some conditional features in the loan 
contract. However, it is suggested that these bankers need to focus more on 
understanding small businesses so that the potential of these businesses can be 
identified for viable funding. 
INTRODUCTION 
Small businesses, unlike big corporations, do not have access to the capital 
market, especially where equity finance is concerned, and therefore rely heavily on 
bank loans for their financial needs. However, when considering loans to these 
businesses banks encounter a series of risks, and many of these risks arise from , 
agency problems in their relationships. It is also argued that the agency problems are 
likely to be most significant when the business is small. These, sometimes, affect the 
willingness of some banks to enter into contract to supply the needed funds to the 
small business sector. This paper highlights the agency problems in the relationship 
between banks and small businesses, the use of several loans features to overcome 
the problems, and other alternatives to increase the accessibility of bank funding to 
the small business sector. - 
AGENCY RELATIONSHIP 
The agency theory focuses on the relationship under which one or more 
persons (principals) engage another person (agent) to perform some services on their 
behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This contract involves delegating some decision- 
making authority to the agent. In the case of a small business, the agent is typically 
the owner, and the principal is the supplier of external fund, notably the bank. This 
separation of ownership and control may result in a problematic relationship because 
there is always a possibility that the agent may not act in the best interest of the 
principal but instead acts in his own self-interest (Peterson, 1994). The small 
business has considerable operational flexibility that makes it easier to transfer assets 
to other uses in response to a changing business environment, andathis can have an 
adverse effect to the bank (Pettit & Singer, 1985). 
The first problem that arises from the agency relationship is the asymmetry 
of information. This problem, sometimes referred to as 'hidden knowledge or 
information', occurs when one party to a transaction Qows  relevant information 
which has a material effect on the transaction, but which is not known to dhe other 
party (Binks et al, 1992; Amit et al, 1998). Thq small business owners when 
approaching the banks for loans always have an informational advantage over the 
bankers that sometimes leads them to overstate the soundness of their business 
projects in relation to the funding sought (Storey, 1994). This problem can impede 
the flow of funds to the small business sector, and the banks may choose to ration the 
amount of loans they grant or extend credit only on relatively unfavourable terms 
(Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
The second problem to an agency relationship is the moral hazard, often 
described as 'hidden action'. It is a situation where an agent does not act in a 
manner consistent with the contract with the principal, or in the principal's best 
interest (Guesnerie et al, 1988). The issue of moral hazard was first discussed in 
insurance markets where the insured parties could take actions that either increase or 
decrease the risk of hazard (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). For example, after 
purchasing a motor insurance, the insured party could either drive safely or 
dangerously. Arrow (1973) and Pauly (1979) who conducted earlier work on moral 
hazard found that it could also cause market failure. In a situation of small business 
lending, the problem of moral hazard arises where the action of the owner who 
successfully obtained a bank loan is not directly observable by the banker. This 
borrower might use the funds for other purposes than stipulated in the contract, 
sometimes out of self-interest, and such actions may impose high costs on the 
banker. It can also occur where during the contract period, the incentives of the two 
parties change, and as a result the riskiness of the contract is altered (Heffeman, 
1996). 
The asymmetry .of information can give rise to a third problem, adverse 
selection, which causes inefficient allocation in the market (Amit et al, 1998). In this 
situation, the market may be crowded with 'low quality' projects, simply because it 
is hard for the lenders to distinguish between good quality and bad quality projects. 
These lenders have to make decisions based on their knowledge of the borrower's 
skills and competencies (Read, 1998). The adverse selection occurs in small 
business lending because bankers cannot distinguish between the two types of 
borrower, the good risk and bad risk. It is also argued that a bad risk borrower has 
an incentive to pretend to be a good borrower, and thus benefits from more 
favourable lending conditions (Cowling & Sugden, 1995). To prevent this problem, 
the bank may raise the collateral required from the good borrower, thus removing the 
incentive for the bad borrower to default. But, by doing so the bank also imposes 
unfair cost on the good borrower. 
The agency problems can give rise to costs in maintaining the relationship. 
These costs include the costs of monitoring and bonding. Monitoring costs occur 
because the activities of agent (borrower) must be monitored to ensure that he 
conforms to the contract. Bonding costs are incurred by the agent to guarantee that 
he will not take certain actions that would harm the principal (banker), and/or to 
ensure that the principal is compensated if the agent does take such actions. 
Therefore, these agency problems have contributed significantly to the costs and the 
availability of funding to small businesses. The bankers often require greater level 
of compensation and protection to cover the risks and overcome the problems of 
asymmetric information, such as charging.higher interest rates on the borrowers. 
OVERCOMING THE AGENCY PROBLEMS 
Banks face difficulties in overcoming the problem of moral hazard because 
it is not economical to devote resources to appraisal and monitoring where the loans 
are relatively small. When making lending decisions on small businesses, these 
banks also make errors because of adverse selection. Deakins & Hussain (1994) 
categorise the adverse selection as Type I and Type I1 errors. Type I error is where a 
banker turns down a proposition which turns out to be a business success, and Type 
I1 error is where a banker accepts a proposition which turns out to be a business 
failure. The bankers may be concerned only with avoiding Type I1 errors and not 
Type I, as the latter will not affect them unless the banks failed to achieve their 
targets. These partly explain why some small business propositions which have high 
potential for growth and profitability, are turned away by the banks. 
To cover the risks and overcome the problems of agency relationship, 
banks may require greater level of compensation and protection, such as charging 
higher interest rates, asking for higher collateral requirements, and/or imposing some 
conditional features in the loan contract. Some studies, however, have found out that 
adjusting interest rates does not reduce the problem of adverse selection or moral 
hazard. On the contrary, it influences the riskiness of the average borrower as well 
as the demand for funds. Higher interest rates attract riskier borrowers, an adverse 
selection problem, and induces borrowers receiving loans to alter their behaviour to 
adopt more risky projects, a moral hazard problem. Hence, banks may address the 
problems by restricting the amount of lending rather than increasing interest rates. 
Collateral requirement is the most common feature used in a loan contract 
to help resolve the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. It can be used to 
signal commitment on the part of the owner to the success of his venture. Collateral 
can either be pledging of assets owned by the firm or pledging of assets owned 
outside the firm, typically assets belonging to the firm's owners (Berger & U-dell, 
1998). The former reorders the claims of the firm's creditors by giving one of them 
priority through a security interest in specific assets. The latter enhances the claim of 
a single creditor by conveying recourse against additional assets outside the firm 
without diminishing the claims of the other creditors in the event of bankruptcy. 
Collateral reduces the moral hazard problem because the owner is unlikely to switch 
into a riskier project or to reduce effort unless he is willing to lose the collateral 
(Boot et al, 1991). The level of collateral the small business borrower is willing to 
provide improves his incentives, and certainly influences the lending decision. Of 
the two forms of collateral, pledging of assets belonging to the owners is more 
acceptable for small business lending (Avery et al, 1998). Since many small 
businesses cannot be viewed as financial entities separate from their owners, the 
personal assets of the owners will play a key role in detkrmining the avaijability of 
credit, for which they would otherwise not qualify or be able to negotiate better 
terms. On the other hand, pledging of a firm3s"'assets cannot be viewed as a 
complementary arrangement that contributes to enhancing a small borrower's 
creditworthiness. 
Loan covenant is another feature that can be imposed in the contract by the 
banker. This covenant will limit the actions of the business owner, the borrower. It 
is intended to give the banker more control and prevent the borrower from engaging 
in activities against the banker's interest. The borrower must first obtain permission 
from his banker before embarking on any significant strategic changes such as 
changing his financial condition or strategy. Studies by Rajan & Winton (1995), 
Berlin & Mester (1992) and Park (1994) showed that by giving banks the right to 
renegotiate or call loans when covenants are violated, the efficiency of the loan 
contract is enhanced. It also gives more flexibility and control on the loan contract. 
Furthermore, control rights from covenants reduce borrower adverse selection and 
moral hazard (Smith & Warner, 1979). Firms with most credit risk and greatest 
moral hazard incentives are also found to the bounded with the strictest covenants 
(Berlin & Mester, 1993). 
However, Berger & Udell (1998) argue that little is known on the use of 
covenants on small business loans, although there is some empirical evidence to 
suggest their uses in lending to larger firms. Moreover, effective covenants 
generally cannot be imposed on small firms, which do not have credibly prepared or 
audited financial statements (Ravid, 1996). Alternatively, banks can shorten the 
maturity of loan as a means to control the behaviour of small firms. It is believed that 
the longer the loan contract is, the greater the opportunity for the borrower to alter 
his risk behaviour. Shortening the loan maturity can also be viewed as a particularly 
strong type of covenant. With a sequence of short-term loans, a banker can force 
negotiation frequently, whereas in covenants, renegotiation can only be triggered by 
those enumerated in the loan agreement. 
Another alternative to overcome the asymmetric information problems of 
small businesses is to employ commitment loans. A commitment loan is a forward 
contract issued by a bank to provide loan under pre-specified terms over some future 
interval, unless the borrower's condition has suffered 'material adverse change', or 
the borrower has violated a covenant in the contract. A commitment loan can be in 
the form of overdraft, or in the case of US banks, a line of credit, where it allows the 
small business to borrow up to an agreed amount at any given time over a specified 
period. Whether and when a loan is taken down are at the borrower's discretion. 
The bank is usually compensated in the form of fees charged on unused balances 
plus up-front fees and usage fees in some cases. The contract also gives the bank a 
degree of flexibility in the design and enables it to circumvent the losses related to its 
inability to observe the borrower's action choice. In addition, it provides protection 
for the borrower against credit rationing or credit crunches of the general market 
conditions (Avery & Berger, 1991; Cressy, 1996; Morgan, 1998). However, it is 
also argued that a commitment contract can exacerbate the asymmetric information 
problem. Because the contract is usually signed at an earlier time where less 
information is available than for spot loan agreement, it allows borrower to risk-shift 
to take advantage of the bank (Houston & Venkataram, 1994; Berger & Udell; 
1998). Furthermore, the bank will face difficulty to take action on the borrower later 
in the relationship because of the pre-specified contract terms. Therefore, the bank 
risk is unambiguously increased because, in some states of nature, it is committed to 
honour the contract terms it might otherwise refuse. 
THE MALAYSIAN EXPERIENCE 
Is the relationship between banks and small businesses in Malaysia 
problematic? This issue has also been the focus of debates among various interested 
parties, especially the authorities, academics, bankers, small business community and 
the media. It is often argued that small businesses here have not been getting their 
due share of bank funding, and the banks also have not been able to take care of their 
credit needs. Studies have confirmed that small businesses in Malaysia had 
difficulties in gaining access to the financial institutions, and most of them finance 
their operations using their own capital, from relatives and friends or through non- 
institutional sources (Chee, 1986; Hameed, 1995). They also reveal that the 
proportion of loans, if given to small businesses is much smaller than that of larger 
firm or that the packages are inflexible to meet their needs. It is also argued that, 
when faced with financial difficulties, the small business owners seldom or never 
approach the bank because of limited experience with the bank procedures (Hameed, 
1995). Sometimes, the experience of other small business owners who failed to 
obtain assistance from these institutions may discourage others from even trying to 
apply a loan from the financial institutions. On the other hand, banks have refuted 
the claims on the unavailability of bank funding to the small business sector. They 
are suggesting that there is an abundance of capital to invest but the demand for 
loans or the viable business propositions from this sector is inadequate. 
However, a recent study by this writer (Rosli Mahmood, 2000) confirmed 
that the agency problems exist too in the relationship between banks and the small 
business community in Malaysia. The finding of this study revealed a conservative 
attitude among most of the bank managers when deciding on lending to small 
businesses. Most of them also took a very cautious approach, especially when 
confronting with new ventures. This finding also seems to be consistent with the 
literature, and a plausible explanation for the attitude of these bankers is that, the 
asymmetry of information is also associated with small businesses in Malaysia. 
Given this attitude, it would be hardly surprising if these banks were reluctant to 
finance longer-term loans, where it would incur conside;able risk and high 
monitoring costs. 
The banks in Malaysia also operate in an imperfect market where the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard occur, and therefore they are always 
I 
preoccupied with perceived risks when dealing with small business cugtomers. This 
pre-occupation with risk, perhaps, may have contributed to the reluctance of some 
bankers to commit funds to small businesses, evEn in some circumstances where they 
were accompanied by collateral or guarantee. In addition, most bankers would 
always consider the small business proposition from the point of view of a potential 
risk of loan default rather than future viability of the business or project. The finding 
also reveals the employment of a mainly 'gone concern' approach among the bank 
managers when analyzing the financial information. This approach focuses on how a 
loan would be repaid if the business fails rather than the future prospects of the 
business itself. 
CONCLUSION 
The agency problems in the relationship between the banks and the small 
businesses in Malaysia could cause harmful under-financing to the small business 
sector. The lack of information could also lead a bank to an excessive caution when 
assessing loan application form the small businesses. This is further exacerbated by 
a gap between the bankers and the small business owners. This gap is caused mainly 
by lacked of understanding among some of the bankers who sometimes perceive 
small business owners as a potential portfolio of non-performing loans, and thus are 
reluctant to help them. To address these problems, bankers need to focus more on 
understanding the small business sector, and work out procedures for channeling 
required funds to it. They can obtain valuable information through monitoring the 
operations of the small business borrowers. This helps in building up knowledge of 
the small businesses, and their potential for viable funding. 
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